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Abstract: We find that auditors of more conservative clients charge lower fees, issue fewer 
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imposing less engagement risk on their auditors. Using path analysis we find evidence that both 
inherent risk and auditor business risk explain these associations. Also consistent with 
conservatism reducing auditor business risk, we find that client conservatism is associated with 
fewer lawsuits against auditors and with fewer client restatements. Taken together, our results 
are consistent with auditors viewing client conservatism as an important determinant of 
engagement risk that in turn affects auditor-client contracting decisions. Our findings should be 
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Client Conservatism and Auditor-Client Contracting 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Conditional conservatism is a qualitative accounting characteristic that potentially 
enhances financial reporting quality (Watts 2003). However, while research documents that 
conservatism improves debt contracting, benefits shareholders, and increases investment 
efficiency (Ahmed et al. 2002; Suijs 2008; Francis and Martin 2010), there is limited evidence 
on whether it affects auditor-client contracting. We attempt to fill this gap by investigating 
whether and how client conservatism affects audit fee pricing, audit opinion formation, and 
auditor resignation decisions. 
Conditional conservatism refers to the asymmetric verification of gains versus losses, 
where greater verification is required to recognize gains than losses (Basu 1997). 1 The greater 
the difference in required verification, the greater the level of conservatism. The adoption of 
conservative accounting is partially motivated by the assertion that managers have stronger 
incentives to overstate earnings than to understate earnings (Watts 2003). Consistent with this 
assertion, Kothari et al. (2009) find that career concerns and compensation contracts provide 
incentives for managers to delay the disclosure of bad news and hasten the disclosure of good 
news to investors. LaFond and Watts (2008) argue that conservatism acts to offset management’s 
inherent tendency to defer the release of bad news and accelerate the release of good news.  
We posit that conservatism is likely to affect auditor engagement risk. Whether its net 
effects increase or decrease engagement risk, however, is difficult to predict. One way 
conservatism may decrease engagement risk is by reducing inherent risk. Conservatism can 
reduce inherent risk by mitigating aggressive financial reporting, such as premature revenue 
                                                 
1  For brevity, we sometimes refer to client conditional conservatism simply as conservatism. We focus on 
conditional conservatism because its theoretical and empirical link to litigation risk (Chung and Wynn 2008) and 
misstatement risk (Ettredge et al. 2012b) is clearer than unconditional conservatism.  
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recognition, which often results in misstatements. Conservatism can also reduce inherent risk 
through the timelier recognition of bad news, such as impairment charges, which keep auditors 
better informed about their clients’ adverse circumstances and lowers information asymmetry 
between the auditor and management (Kim and Zhang 2014). Conservatism may also reduce 
engagement risk by decreasing the auditor’s business risk, which consists primarily of auditor 
litigation and reputation risk. Conservatism is likely to reduce litigation risk because auditors are 
primarily sued for financial reports that fail to reflect bad news on a timely basis (Carcello and 
Palmrose 1994). Timelier loss recognition is likely to make it more difficult for plaintiffs to 
argue that financial reports do not provide adequate warning of impending losses. Conservatism 
may decrease auditor reputation risk by reducing negative events, such as material 
misstatements, which adversely affect the auditor’s ability to attract and retain clients (Weber et 
al. 2008). Conservative clients may also reduce engagement risk through improved governance, 
as evidenced by more independent boards (Lara et al. 2009), stronger internal controls (Goh and 
Li 2011), and reduced managerial risk-taking (Ahmed and Duellman 2013). 
However, there are also reasons why conservatism may increase engagement risk. One is 
that the timelier recognition of bad news increases the likelihood of covenant violation (Gigler et 
al. 2009; Gao and Gu 2014; Zhang 2008), which in turn increases default risk and the likelihood 
of financial distress (Chen and Church 1992). This heightens auditor litigation risk because 
shareholders of distressed clients are more likely to sue their auditors (Palmrose 1997). Recent 
studies also find that conservatism impairs earnings quality. Barth et al. (2013) report that 
conservatism causes investors to fixate on negatively skewed earnings, consistent with Heflin et 
al. (2014), who find that conservatism harms earnings informativeness. Dichev and Tang (2008) 
and Chen et al. (2014) also find that conservatism increases earnings volatility and reduces 
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earnings persistence. Since higher audit quality is associated with more informative and 
predictable earnings (DeFond et al. 2014), clients with poor earnings quality pose greater 
reputation risk to their auditors, providing incentives for the auditor to reduce the remediable 
bias that arises from conservatism.   
The above arguments suggest that the net effect of conservatism on auditors’ risk 
assessment is ultimately an empirical question. We posit that these effects are likely to be 
reflected in the strategies auditors use to mitigate engagement risk. One such strategy is to 
increase audit effort. If this fails to reduce risk to tolerable levels, auditors may also charge a risk 
premium, passing the risk onto the client. Both audit effort and risk premia affect audit fees 
(Johnstone and Bedard 2004). Another strategy for mitigating risk is lowering the threshold for 
issuing a going concern opinion (hereafter GCO). Issuing a GCO prior to bankruptcy reduces the 
auditor’s exposure to litigation risk and lowers settlement amounts (Kaplan and Williams 2013). 
Finally, auditors can also mitigate risk by resigning from risky clients (Shu 2000). Thus, if 
conservative clients reduce engagement risk, we expect auditors to respond by charging lower 
fees, issuing fewer GCOs, and resigning less frequently. Conversely, if conservative clients 
increase risk, we expect higher fees, more GCOs, and more frequent resignations. 
We test the association between client conservatism and fees, GCOs, and resignations 
using data over the period 2000-2010 and conditional conservatism proxied by the firm-year 
specific measures employed in Khan and Watts (2009) (hereafter KW) and Givoly and Hayn 
(2000) (hereafter GH). We find that client conservatism is associated with lower audit fees, 
fewer GCOs, and less frequent auditor resignations. Further, we find these associations with each 
strategy individually and with all three simultaneously. Moreover, we perform tests that suggest 
reverse causality is unlikely to explain our findings. We also find that these effects are 
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economically important. Using the KW (GH) measure, moving from the bottom to the top decile 
of conservatism decreases audit fees by 29 (10) percent, decreases the issuance of GCOs by 2.8 
(1.7) percent, and lowers the probability of resignation by 21 (11) percent, respectively.2 Our 
findings are also robust to several sensitivity tests, including measuring conservatism over a 
long-horizon and controlling for potentially omitted correlated variables. 
We also perform a path analysis to test our maintained assumption that inherent risk is the 
direct path, and auditor business risk is the indirect path, through which conservatism affects our 
outcome variables (i.e., fees, GCOs, and resignations). Consistent with this assumption, we find 
that conservatism directly affects the outcome variables by reducing inherent risk, and indirectly 
by reducing audit business risk (through reduced litigation and misstatement risk). We also 
perform ex post validation tests which find that conservatism is associated with fewer auditor 
lawsuits and fewer client restatements (that are unrelated to auditor litigation), corroborating the 
notion that conservatism reduces auditor business risk.  
Finally, we find that auditors do not strategically respond to unconditional conservatism by 
adjusting their fees, GCO frequency, or propensity to resign. We also find that unconditional 
conservatism is not associated with lawsuits against auditors or client restatements. Therefore, 
our analysis is consistent with auditors not responding to unconditional conservatism because, 
unlike conditional conservatism, it does not affect auditor business risk.   
Our study makes several contributions. One is to the literature that studies conservatism. 
Several studies document the benefits of conservatism in debt contracting, equity markets, and 
investment efficiency, but its role in shaping auditor-client contracting has drawn little attention. 
While it is often argued that conservatism benefits auditors through reduced litigation risk (Watts 
                                                 
2 While the decreases in issuance of GCOs by 2.8 (1.7) percent is small in absolute terms, this is quite large relative 
to the base rate for GCOs of 3.3 (8.4) percent for the KW (GH) measure. 
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2003), there are also arguments that challenge this assertion (Barth et al. 2013; Gao and Gu. 
2014; Gigler et al. 2009), and there is little evidence documenting this association. The only 
exception we are aware of is a concurrent study by Lee et al. (2014), which finds that audit fees 
are negatively associated with conservatism. Our study contributes beyond Lee et al. (2014) by 
(1) examining the effects of conservatism on GCOs and auditor resignations, (the results of 
which are not inferable from examining fees alone), 3  (2) using path analysis and ex post 
validation tests to identify client inherent risk and auditor business risk as important explanations 
for these associations, and (3) finding that unconditional conservatism, unlike conditional 
conservatism, is not associated with audit fees, GCOs, or resignations. 
We also contribute to the literature that examines engagement risk. While prior studies 
examine client characteristics such as complexity, leverage, financial distress, and discretionary 
accruals as a source of risk, we examine the effects of conservatism, which is distinct from these 
other characteristics. We find that both litigation risk and misstatement risk are mediated paths 
through which conservatism affects auditors’ contracting decisions, although litigation risk plays 
a relatively more important role. This supports the notion that auditors’ preferences for 
conservatism are largely driven by their ability to mitigate litigation risk (Watts 2003). 
 Finally, we also add to the literature that contrasts the effects of conditional and 
unconditional conservatism. We extend this literature by finding that conditional conservatism 
affects auditors’ strategic decisions in responding to client engagement risk, while unconditional 
conservatism does not. We further suggest that this is because unconditional conservatism, 
unlike conditional conservatism, does not impact the incidence of auditor litigation or client 
                                                 
3 When considered in isolation, fees alone are difficult to interpret because higher fees may indicate a risk premium, 
additional audit effort, or a client’s attempt at economic bonding to attain lenient audits. Higher fees are also 
infeasible when clients are unwilling to pay higher fees, or when the risks of reduced conservatism become 
unreasonably high. Thus, evidence from GCOs and auditor resignations provides important additional insights into 
the effects of conservatism that cannot be inferred from fees alone. 
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restatements. Thus, auditors’ failure to strategically respond to unconditional conservatism is ex 
post consistent with unconditional conservatism not affecting auditor business risk. 
The next section discusses related literature and the research issues we address, the third 
section discusses variable measurement and empirical models, the fourth section describes 
sample and empirical findings, and the fifth section presents findings from sensitivity tests of our 
primary analysis. The sixth section provides tests with unconditional conservatism. The final 
section concludes.   
II. RESEARCH ISSUES 
Conservatism and Auditors’ Engagement Risk Assessment 
Engagement risk consists of three components: 1) client business risk — the risk 
associated with the client's survival and profitability; 2) audit risk — the risk that the auditor may 
unknowingly fail to appropriately modify his or her opinion on financial statements that are 
materially misstated; and 3) auditor business risk — the risk of potential litigation costs from an 
alleged audit failure and the risk of other costs such as fee realization and reputational effects. 
Two important elements of auditor business risk are litigation and reputation risk. Litigation 
exposes auditors to direct financial penalties, while lost reputation impairs the ability to retain 
and attract clients.4 Because engagement risk can threaten the viability of even the largest audit 
firm, auditors engage in several strategies to manage the risk (DeFond and Zhang 2014). 
We conjecture that conditional conservatism affects the auditor’s assessment of 
engagement risk, particularly client inherent risk and auditor business risk. Inherent risk is a 
component of “audit risk,” which is the product of the likelihood that environmental and client 
factors will produce a material error (‘inherent risk’), the likelihood that internal controls will not 
                                                 
4 Importantly, litigation and reputation risk are not mutually exclusive. For example, auditor litigation is likely to 
adversely affect an auditor’s reputation, and auditors’ reputation is potentially damaged by non-litigation adverse 
events, such as negative press releases and regulatory sanctions.  
 7 
prevent or detect a material error (‘control risk’), and the likelihood that audit procedures will 
fail to detect the material error (‘detection risk’). We conjecture that conservatism lowers 
inherent risk for two reasons. One is that conservatism is expected to reduce overstatements by 
mitigating aggressive managerial estimates, such as overvaluation of inventory and receivables. 
Since most misstatements involve overstated earnings or revenue (Dechow et al. 2011), auditors 
are likely to perceive a lower level of inherent risk among conservative clients. Conservatism 
should also offset management’s tendency to withhold bad news through timelier recognition of 
bad news events such as impairment charges. This reduction in hidden accumulated negative 
information lowers the information asymmetry between auditors and clients (Kim and Zhang 
2014), thereby reducing the risk of misstatement and the amount of required auditor effort. 
Conservative accounting may also decrease auditor business risk, which consists primarily 
of litigation and reputation risk. This is because conservatism is likely to constrain 
management’s tendency to systematically overstate earnings by acting as a governance 
mechanism that curbs substandard financial reporting (LaFond and Watts 2008). Guay and 
Verrecchia (2007) also contend that conditional conservatism reduces the opportunities for 
successful earnings management. Evidence in Ettredge et al. (2012a) supports this notion by 
finding that relatively more conservative firms are less likely to subsequently restate earnings.  
Reducing overstatements is likely to reduce auditor litigation risk because auditors are sued 
primarily for allowing overstatements (Carcello and Palmrose 1994). Because overstatements are 
consistent with premature recognition of good news and/or delayed recognition of bad news, 
greater conservatism increases the auditor’s ability to curb earnings management. In line with 
this argument, Stice (1991) finds that growth in operating assets increases engagement risk, 
presumably by signaling an increased likelihood of asset write-downs. Moreover, by accelerating 
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the release of bad news and deferring the release of good news, conservatism may make it more 
difficult for plaintiffs to claim that their losses arise from aggressive financial reporting. 
Conservatism is also expected to reduce reputation risk. In addition to litigation, auditors are 
exposed to loss and injury to their professional practice from adverse events such as negative 
press reports, the government investigations of audit failures (Weber et al. 2008), negative 
PCAOB inspection reports (Abbott et al. 2013), and accounting restatements (Hennes et al. 
2014). Because these events typically arise from alleged misstatements, conservatism is expected 
to reduce reputation risk. This is consistent with Hennes et al. (2014), who find that auditors are 
more likely to be dismissed when they fail to prevent misstatements. Moreover, conservatism is 
associated with client governance characteristics that are expected to reduce engagement risk, 
including more independent boards (Lara et al. 2009) and more effective internal controls (Goh 
and Li 2011). In addition, Ahmed and Duellman (2013) find that lower levels of conservatism 
are associated with management overconfidence and risk-taking, which increases the likelihood 
of misstatements (Schrand and Zechman 2012), and is associated with a greater frequency of 
mergers and acquisitions that destroy shareholder value (Malmendier and Tate 2008). 
There are, however, reasons why conservatism may increase audit engagement risk. One is 
that timelier recognition of bad news may trigger more frequent debt covenant violations, 
thereby increasing client default risk and auditor business risk. This is consistent with theory in 
Gigler et al. (2009), who observe that “false alarm” covenant violations induced by conservatism 
make it difficult for debt and equity investors to draw inferences about firms’ underlying 
economics. They argue that a higher frequency of false alarm covenant violations decreases debt 
contracting efficiency if lenders find it difficult to see through the implications of conservatism. 
If lenders are unable to distinguish between lower earnings that result from conservatism and 
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lower earnings that result from poor underlying performance, they are likely to impose harsh 
credit terms in the presence of conservatism, which heightens auditor business risk. Empirical 
evidence in Gao and Gu (2014) supports this conjecture by finding that credit rating agencies 
issue significantly more false alarm “debt defaults” for firms with conservative accounting, 
consistent with these agencies not fully adjusting for conservatism. If low credit ratings 
negatively affect firms’ credit terms and their ability to access debt financing, it will also 
increase auditor business risk. 
Another reason why conservatism may increase engagement risk is because it reduces 
earnings informativeness and persistence, which exposes auditors to higher reputation risk. For 
example, Givoly and Hayn (2002) argue that conservatism can create unwanted bias and noise in 
financial reports, which generates “soft” numbers that induce (rather than mitigate) asymmetry in 
the timely incorporation of economic events into reported earnings. 5 This is consistent with 
Barth et al. (2013), who find that conservatism reduces earnings informativeness, causing 
investors to fixate on negatively skewed earnings. It is also consistent with Heflin et al. (2014), 
who find that conservatism reduces earnings persistence and income smoothing, which in turn 
harms earnings informativeness (as measured by ERCs). Dichev and Tang (2008) and Chen et al. 
(2014) also document that conditional conservatism increases earnings volatility and reduces 
earnings persistence. The negative effects of conservatism on earnings informativeness and 
persistence has implications for auditor behavior, because higher audit quality is associated with 
more informative and predictable earnings (DeFond et al. 2014).6 Thus, conservative clients may 
pose greater reputation risk to their auditors, providing incentives for the auditor to reduce 
                                                 
5 While conservatism may result in large write-offs, contingent liabilities, and restructuring charges, these charges 
may also create cookie jar reserves, thereby distorting earnings informativeness over time (Levitt 1998).  
6 For example, the clients of Big 5 auditors and industry specialist auditors have higher ERCs (Teoh and Wong 
1993; Balsam et al.2003) and smaller analysts’ forecast errors and dispersion (Behn et al. 2008). 
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remediable bias that arises from conservatism. Standard-setters also believe that conservatism 
reduces financial reporting quality and have eliminated it as an essential qualitative characteristic 
of financial reporting (FASB 2010). 
Auditors’ Strategic Responses to Conservatism 
If conservatism affects engagement risk, it should also affect the strategies auditors employ 
to mitigate this risk. One such strategy is to increase audit effort, which mitigates inherent risk 
and auditor business risk by reducing misstatement risk. For example, increased substantive 
testing strengthens the auditor’s assurance that the financial statements are prepared in 
accordance with GAAP. This is consistent with experimental evidence that shows that auditors 
increase audit effort on riskier clients (Davis et al. 1993). If additional audit effort does not 
reduce engagement risk to acceptable levels, auditors may also price protect themselves by 
charging a fee premium, thereby passing the risk onto the client. Johnstone and Bedard (2004) 
support this contention by showing that auditors increase both billing hours and billing rates for 
riskier clients. Theory also concludes that auditors are more likely to exert greater effort for 
clients with a greater likelihood of misstatement or fraud (Hillegeist 1999). Both increased effort 
and fee premia are reflected in higher audit fees. Thus, if conservative clients impose less risk, 
we expect auditors to charge lower fees. Conversely, if conservative clients impose more risk, 
we expect higher fees. 
Auditors can also reduce risk by lowering their threshold for issuing a GCO. Several 
studies find that auditors increase their issuance of GCOs to clients with higher litigation risk 
(Kaplan and Williams 2013) and to clients with larger accruals (Francis and Krishnan 1999). 
Issuing a GCO to financially distressed clients prior to bankruptcy lowers alleged audit failure, 
auditor litigation, and litigation settlements (Carcello and Palmrose 1994; Kaplan and Williams 
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2013). Further, Kida (1980) reports that audit partners believe that failure to issue a GCO when it 
is warranted is “grounds for alleging auditing negligence.” Therefore, if conservative clients 
impose less (more) risk, we expect auditors to issue fewer (more) GCOs. 
Finally, it is possible that increased effort, risk premia, and/or the issuance of GCOs may 
not reduce client risk to tolerable levels. In such cases auditors may choose to avoid the risk 
altogether by resigning from the engagement. Managers have incentives and the ability to 
withhold bad news and accelerate the release of good news in the hope that poor current 
performance will be camouflaged by strong performance in the future (Kothari et al. 2009). 
Because these incentives conflict with those of the auditor, they can cause a serious breakdown 
in the relationship between management and the auditor, hindering the auditor’s ability to 
remediate client risk. Consistent with this argument, prior studies find that auditor resignations 
are more frequent when clients pose higher litigation risk (Shu 2000) and exhibit greater 
opportunism proxied by real activities manipulation (Kim and Park 2014). Therefore, if 
conservative clients impose less (more) risk, we expect auditors to resign less (more) frequently. 
It is difficult to predict whether auditors will choose one or more strategy in response to 
client risk, because the choice is likely to be a function of client factors such as financial health. 
For example, since GCOs are only appropriate for clients in financial distress, lowering the 
threshold for GCOs is unlikely to be effective for reducing the risk posed by healthy clients. In 
addition, auditors are likely to resign only as a last resort. While increased effort and risk premia 
may seem the most feasible response in most cases, these strategies are limited by the client’s 
willingness to pay higher fees. Therefore, given the difficulty in predicting which strategy(s) 
auditors are likely to choose in response to conservatism, we perform tests that examine each 
strategy individually as well as all three strategies simultaneously.  
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III. VARIABLES MEASUREMENT AND MODEL SPECIFICATION 
Measuring Conditional Conservatism 
We use two firm-year proxies for conditional conservatism. The first is derived from the 
KW conservatism score (C_Score), which is based on the model in Basu (1997) and is 
commonly used in recent studies (Ettredge et al. 2012a; Heflin et al. 2014). Following KW, we 
estimate C_Score for each firm-year using a cross-sectional approach based on size, leverage, 
and market-to-book ratio. The second is GH’s measure of non-operating accruals. Although 
some non-operating accruals are dictated by GAAP, GH argue that the timing or amount of most 
non-operating accruals are subject to management discretion. To mitigate the effect of temporary 
non-operating accruals that reverse in subsequent years and to capture persistent conservatism, 
we use a three-year average of non-operating accruals. To ease interpretation, we multiply the 
non-operating accruals by negative one so that its value increases with the level of conservatism. 
We use the annual decile ranks of each measure to reduce noise in the estimates and to 
mitigate potential non-linearity. We standardize the decile ranks to a range from zero to one, 
with the bottom decile valued at zero and the top decile valued at one. We refer to the two 
standardized rank variables as CON_KW and CON_NOPA.   
Empirical Models 
To test whether conservatism is associated with audit fees, we estimate the following OLS 
model based on prior research (Ashbaugh et al. 2003). Detailed variable definitions for all 
models are presented in Appendix 1. 
LAUDITt =γ0 + γ1 CONSVt-1 + γ2 MVt + γ3 Quickt + γ4 Losst + γ5 ROAt + γ6 LEVt + γ7 Inv_Rect  
+ γ8 BMt + γ9 NSEGt + γ10 SPITEMt + γ11 FOPSt + γ12 Mergert + γ13 Financet + γ14 Pensiont  
+ γ15 BigNt + γ16 GCOt + γ17 Busyt + Industry & Year Dummies + et                              (1) 
 
LAUDIT is measured as the log of audit fees. In this and the following models, CONSV 
refers to our two conservatism measures, CON_KW or CON_NOPA, and all independent 
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variables are measured in the year concurrent with audit fees except CONSV, which is lagged by 
one-year. We use lagged conservatism in our tests to help mitigate concerns with endogeneity 
and reverse causality. While the auditors’ choice of fees, GCO, and resignation potentially affect 
client conservatism in the contemporaneous year, it is unlikely that they affect prior year’s client 
conservatism. In all models we use standard errors clustered by firm. A negative (positive) 
coefficient on CONSV is consistent with lower (higher) fees for more conservative clients. 
To test whether accounting conservatism is associated with the issuance of GCOs, we 
estimate the following logistic model adapted from DeFond et al. (2002): 
OPINt = λο + λ1 CONSVt-1 + λ2 Assetst + λ3 ZScoret + λ4 Betat + λ5 Returnt + λ6 LEVt + λ7 CLEVt  
+ λ8 LLosst + λ9 Investmentt + λ10 Cashflowt + λ11 Future_Financet + λ12 BigNt + λ13 BMt  
+Year Dummies + et                                     (2) 
 
OPIN is an indicator variable equal to one for clients receiving a GCO for the first time, 
and zero otherwise. Following DeFond et al. (2002), we only retain GCO firms in the first year 
they receive a GCO, and estimate the model using a sample of distressed firms, defined as firms 
that report either negative net income or negative operating cash flows.7 A negative (positive) 
coefficient on CONSV is consistent with fewer (more) GCOs for more conservative clients. 
To test whether conservatism is associated with auditor resignations, we estimate the 
following logistic regression adapted from Landsman et al. (2009): 
RESIGNt = β0 + β1 CONSVt-1 + β2 Asset_Growth t-1 + β3 Abs_DA t-1 + β4 Inv_Rec t-1+ β5 GCO t-1 
+ β6 Clean t-1 + β7 Tenure t-1 + β8 ROA t-1 + β9 Loss t-1 + β10 LEV t-1 + β11 Cash t-1 + β12 Disagree t-1 
+ β13 Rep_Event t-1 + β14 BigN t-1 + β15 Assets t-1 + β16 Merger t-1 + β17 BM t-1 +Year Dummies + et       (3) 
 
Following prior studies (Landsman et al. 2009; Kim and Park 2014), we estimate this 
model using auditor-switch firms with the independent variables measured in the year prior to 
                                                 
7 As a robustness check, we examine two other samples based on alternative measures of distress. The first is from 
Kaplan and Williams (2013) who define distressed firms as having two consecutive years of net losses and negative 
retained earnings in the latest year. The second is from Geiger and Rama (2003), who define distress as having at 
least one of the following: negative working capital, negative retained earnings, or a loss. The results are robust to 
using these alternative measures of distress. When we estimate the model without restricting the sample to distressed 
firms, our main findings are also qualitatively similar.  
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the switch. RESIGN is an indicator variable equal to one if the auditor resigns and zero if the 
auditor is dismissed. A negative (positive) coefficient on CONSV is consistent with less (more) 
frequent resignations from more conservative clients. 
IV. SAMPLE AND EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Sample and Data 
We collect all audit-related information from the Audit Analytics database for the period 
2000-2010, and merge it with Compustat and CRSP data to obtain financial and stock return 
variables. Because we lag conservatism by one year, it is estimated during the period 1999-2009. 
Consistent with prior research, we remove firms in the financial sector (SIC codes 60-69) and 
winsorize all continuous variables at the top and bottom one percent. Due to more restrictive data 
requirements, the CON_KW sample is smaller than the CON_NOPA sample.  
Our audit fee sample totals 27,748 (41,537) firm-year observations for the CON_KW 
(CON_NOPA) model. Our financially distressed sample for the GCO tests totals 9,284 (12,462) 
firm-year observations for the CON_KW (CON_NOPA) model. Of these observations, a total of 
302 (1,052) firms [3.3% (8.4%)] receive a GCO for the first time during the sample period.8 
Lastly, our auditor change sample totals 2,404 (3,117) firm-years for the CON_KW 
(CON_NOPA) model. This sample excludes auditors switching from Andersen in 2001-2002 
since these are forced switches. The auditor change sample includes 418 (611) resignations 
[17.4% (19.6%)] for the CON_KW (CON_NOPA) model, while the rest are dismissals.9 The 
                                                 
8 The proportion of the firms with GCOs in our GH sample is comparable to the 9% reported in DeFond et al. 
(2002). The proportion of GCOs for the KW sample is lower because KW delete firms with share prices less than $1 
and firms in the top and bottom one percent of the variables used in estimating C_Score (see KW p. 138). If we 
relax these filters, we find qualitatively identical results, and the proportion of GCOs is 8.9%.  
9 We note that our sample period includes the years 2004 and 2005, the years in which Section 404 was initially 
implemented under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX). Thus, some of our resignations may be due to capacity 
constraints that forced some auditors to resign due to the heavy demands required by the newly implemented 
internal control audits.   
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smaller proportion of resignations relative to dismissals is consistent with prior studies 
(Landsman et al. 2009; Kim and Park 2014). 
Empirical Results  
Audit Fee Test 
Table 1, Panel A reports the sample distribution by year and industry, while Panel B shows 
the descriptive statistics of the variables used in the audit fee model. Panel C reports the 
multivariate test results and shows that the coefficients on CON_KW and CON_NOPA are 
significantly negative at p<0.01, consistent with auditors charging lower audit fees to more 
conservative clients. The estimated coefficient -0.293 (-0.097) on CON_KW (CON_NOPA) 
indicates that a one-decile increase in conservatism is associated with about a 3.3 (1.1) percent 
decline in audit fees.10 Thus, the relation between conservatism and audit fees is economically 
significant. Consistent with prior research, audit fees are higher among clients that are larger 
(MV), have higher operating risk (Loss and LEV), have greater complexity (NSEG, SPITEM, and 
FOPS), have December year-ends (Busy), are less profitable (ROA), engage in mergers and 
acquisitions (Merger), hire a Big N auditor (BigN), and receive a GCO (GCO). 
Going Concern Modified Opinion Test 
Table 2, Panel A reports the sample distribution by year and industry, and Panel B reports 
the descriptive statistics of the variables used in the GCO model. Panel C reports the multivariate 
test results and shows that the coefficient on CON_KW is negative and significant at p<0.05, and 
the coefficient on CON_NOPA is negative but not significant at conventional levels. (Although 
in a one-tailed test this coefficient is significant at p=0.07). Thus, auditors are less likely to issue 
GCOs to more conservative distressed clients, although the results are weaker for the GH 
                                                 
10 The annual decile ranks of our conservatism measures range between 0 and 1, and the difference in each decile 
rank is 1/9. Thus, the percentage change in fees when CONSV shifts from one decile to the next decile can be 
calculated as the coefficient estimate of CONSV times 1/9. 
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measure of conservatism. In terms of economic significance, the marginal effect of a one-decile 
increase in CON_KW and CON_NOPA decreases the likelihood of a GCO by 0.3% and 0.2%, 
respectively.11 Consistent with prior literature, we find that firms receiving a GCO tend to have 
higher bankruptcy scores (ZScore), smaller size (Assets), loss-making in the prior year (LLoss), 
poorer operating cash flows (Cashflow), lower liquidity (Investment), smaller future financing 
(Future_Finance), and lower book-to-market ratio (BM).12  
Auditor Resignation Test 
Table 3, Panel A reports the sample distribution by year and industry, and Panel B reports 
descriptive statistics for the variables used for the auditor resignation model. Panel C reports the 
multivariate test results and shows that the coefficients on CON_KW and CON_NOPA are 
significantly negative at p<0.01, consistent with auditors being less likely to resign from more 
conservative clients. A one-decile increase in CON_KW and CON_NOPA reduces the propensity 
of auditors to resign by 2.3% and 1.2% respectively. Consistent with prior research, we also find 
that auditors are more likely to resign from clients with shorter auditor tenure (Tenure), higher 
leverage (LEV), lower cash holdings (Cash), more reportable events (Rep_Event), larger absolute 
discretionary accruals (Abs_DA), smaller size (Assets), and by non-Big N auditors (BigN).  
                                                 
11 The marginal effect for a one-decline increase in conservatism measure is computed as p x (1-p) x b x 1/9, where 
p is the base rate (3.3% for the model using CON_KW and 8.4% for the model using CON_NOPA) and b is the 
estimated coefficient from the logistic regression. 
12 DeFond and Zhang (2014) argue that more GCOs are suggestive of higher audit quality, particularly in settings 
where auditor independence is threatened. They also argue that auditors have incentives to issue more GCOs than 
are appropriate in order to reduce risk exposure. Our finding is consistent with the latter argument. To confirm this, 
in untabulated analysis, we examine Type 1 and 2 audit opinion errors after splitting the sample based on the median 
value of C_Score. Using bankruptcy data from Audit Analytics we find that 41 firms filed for bankruptcy within 12 
months following fiscal year end among the CON_KW sample firms. A Type 1 error (i.e., false alarms) occurs when 
the auditor issues a GCO report and the client does not file for bankruptcy during the subsequent 12 months. A Type 
2 error (i.e., failure to warn of bankruptcy) occurs when the auditor does not issue a GCO report and the client does 
file for bankruptcy during the subsequent 12 months. We compute Type 1 and 2 errors following Francis (2011) and 
find that the Type 1 error rate for the high conservatism group (1.9%) is lower than that for low conservatism group 
(3.1%) with the difference significant at p<0.01, which indicates that auditors make more false alarms for less 
conservative clients. This result suggests that lowering the threshold for issuing a GCO to less conservative clients 
reduces the auditors’ risk exposure, but also results in higher Type 1 errors. We find that the difference in Type 2 
errors between high and low conservatism clients is not significant at conventional levels.   
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Endogeneity Tests 
While we examine auditors’ response to the level of conservatism chosen by their clients, 
conservatism may also be affected by the auditor-client contracting variables. Although we 
expect the use of one-year lagged conservatism in our models to alleviate this concern to some 
degree, we conduct formal endogeneity tests using the two-stage instrumental variable approach 
employed in the Durbin–Wu–Hausman test (Davidson and MacKinnon 1993). Among the five 
drivers of conservatism in KW, we use the length of the investment cycle (Cycle) and firm age 
(Age) as instrumental variables and estimate conservatism with these variables and the other 
control variables used in the respective models.13 We then augment equations (1) through (3) by 
including the residuals (RES) from the first stage regression. The significance of RES tests for the 
potential existence of endogeneity. Panel A of Table 4 reports that the coefficient on RES is 
insignificant in our GCO and auditor resignation models, indicating a lack of endogeneity. 
However, RES is significant at p<0.01 in our audit fee model, suggesting that endogeneity may 
be a concern. 14  We then use the predicted value of conservatism (Predict_CON_KW or 
Predict_CON_NOPA) from the first stage model to replace CONSV. Panel B reports that the 
coefficient on predicted conservatism remains negative and significant at p<0.10 in all models, 
except for the GCO test with Predict_CON_NOPA. These results are largely consistent with 
those reported in the previous tables, indicating that our main findings still hold even after 
                                                 
13 Conceptually, a good instrument is one that is related to conservatism but unrelated to audit fees, GCOs, and 
auditor resignations. We view Cycle and Age as plausible instrumental variables because KW find that conservatism 
is higher for younger firms that tend to have more growth options and for firms with longer investment cycles that 
have higher investment uncertainty. Moreover, it is less likely that these variables would exert a direct, first-order 
effect on fees, GCOs, and auditor resignations, while the effect of the probability of litigation (ProbLit), 
idiosyncratic uncertainly (Volatility), or information asymmetry (Spread) is more likely.  
14 We examine the effect of client conservatism on how auditors price client engagements. Nonetheless, it is possible 
that higher client conservatism may result from auditors exerting additional effort during their audits in order to 
impose greater conservatism on their clients. However, this “reverse causality” should also result in higher audit 
effort, which would in turn result in a positive relation between client conservatism and audit fees, thus biasing 
against our results.  
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controlling for possible endogeneity. 
Following Larcker and Rusticus (2010), we conduct two tests to assess the appropriateness 
of the instruments. First, we perform the overidentification tests (Hansen’s J-test), which 
examine whether the instrumental variables are associated with the dependent variables beyond 
their effects through conservatism. An insignificant test result is consistent with a failure to reject 
the validity of the instruments. Panel B of Table 4 reports that the p-values of the 
overidentification tests are all insignificant, and thus we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the 
instruments are valid in all model specifications. Second, we test the strength of our instrumental 
variables by computing partial F-statistics of the instruments used in the first-stage regressions. 
The partial F-statistics, as reported in panel B of Table 4, range from 12.70 to 291.08, 
consistently higher than the minimum benchmark of 11.59 for models with two instruments 
(Larcker and Rusticus 2010). Thus, we conclude that our models do not suffer from weak 
instruments. 
Lastly, to mitigate the concern that endogeneity arising from omitted correlated variables 
drives our audit fee test results, we perform a change analysis by regressing the change in audit 
fees on changes in the continuous variables in the audit fee model and report the results in Panel 
C of Table 4. The results indicate that the change in conservatism is significantly negatively 
associated with the change in audit fees at p<0.01, consistent with our audit fee level test.15 
Path Analysis 
We next perform a path analysis to test our maintained assumption that inherent risk and 
auditor business risk are the paths through which conservatism affects fees, GCOs, and 
                                                 
15 We are only able to perform a meaningful change analysis for the audit fee model. Because audit fees are 
continuous, they are able to change in response to small changes in conservatism. In contrast, because GCOs and 
resignations are indicator variables, they do not change continuously in response to changes in conservatism. This is 
why prior research typically performs change analyses only for models that have continuous independent and 
dependent variables. 
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resignations. Path analysis uses a structural equation model to answer how a source variable (in 
our case conservatism) affects an outcome variable (in our case fees, GCOs, or resignations) by 
decomposing the correlation between the source variable and an outcome variable into their 
direct path, and their indirect paths through mediating variables. (Baron and Kenny 1986). We 
expect inherent risk to be a direct path through which conservatism affects our outcome 
variables; and we expect auditor business risk to be an indirect path that is mediated by litigation 
and misstatement risk. A direct path includes only one path coefficient, while an indirect path 
includes a path coefficient between the source variable and the mediating variable as well as a 
path coefficient between the mediating variable and the outcome variable. The total magnitude of 
the indirect path is the product of these two path coefficients. The path analysis automatically 
standardizes all variables in the model with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one, 
allowing comparison of the magnitudes of the coefficients.  
In addition to auditor litigation risk, we also use misstatement risk as a mediating variable, 
because misstatements (even in the absence of litigation) expose auditors to loss and injury, such 
as negative press reports and PCAOB sanctions. Our proxy for expected auditor litigation risk 
(ShuScore) is the annual decile rank of Shu’s (2000) score, and our proxy for expected 
misstatement risk (Misstate_Risk) is the average annual decile rank of Dechow et al.’s (2011) F-
score, Beneish’s (1999) M-score, and Dechow and Dichev’s (2002) accrual quality. We use 
expected measures because the likelihood of future litigation and misstatement is uncertain at the 
time of the audit. Following prior studies that use path analysis (Pervzner et al. 2014), we 
estimate the following model: 
DepVart = β0 + β1 CONSVt-1 + β2 ShuScoret + β3 Misstate_Riskt + Controls + et               (4A)       
ShuScoret = α0 + α1 CONSVt-1+ et                  (4B) 
Misstate_Risk t = δ 0 + δ 1 CONSVt-1+ et                    (4C) 
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Equation (4A) includes a dependent variable (DepVar) for each outcome variable (i.e., 
audit fees, GCOs and resignations) and relevant control variables (Controls) from equations (1)-
(3). The path coefficient β1 is the magnitude of the direct path from conservatism to the DepVar, 
while the path coefficient α1*β2 (δ1*β3) is the magnitude of the indirect path from conservatism 
to the DepVar mediated through auditor litigation risk (misstatement risk). The significance of 
the indirect effect is estimated using the Sobel (1982) test statistics. Figure 1 illustrates posited 
direct and indirect paths for the above model along with their coefficients and predicted signs. 
Table 5 presents the path coefficients of interest. Panel A reports the results for the audit 
fee test. We focus our discussion on CON_KW as the results with CON_NOPA are similar. The 
direct path coefficient between conservatism and audit fees [p(CON_KW, LAUDIT)] is 
significantly negative at p<0.01, consistent with lower inherent risk from higher conservatism 
directly decreasing auditor effort. The path coefficient between conservatism and auditor 
litigation risk [p(CON_KW, ShuScore)] is significantly negative, indicating that auditors face less 
litigation risk from more conservative clients. The path coefficient between auditor litigation risk 
and audit fees [p(ShuScore, LAUDIT)] is significantly positive, consistent with higher litigation 
risk leading to higher fees. The total mediated path for litigation risk [p(CON_KW, ShuScore) x 
p(ShuScore, LAUDIT)] is significantly negative at p<0.01, with a coefficient of -0.049. The 
coefficient implies that a one-standard-deviation increase in CON_KW results in a 0.049-
standard-deviation decrease in audit fees through CON_KW’s impact on auditor litigation risk. 
This suggests that the proportion of the total effect (the sum of the direct and the mediated path 
coefficients) of CON_KW on audit fees that is attributable to litigation risk is about 35% [=-
0.049/(-0.089-0.049-0.003)]. The path coefficient between conservatism and misstatement risk 
[p(CON_KW, Misstate_Risk)] is also significantly negative, suggesting that auditors face lower 
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misstatement risk from more conservative clients. The path coefficient between misstatement 
risk and audit fees [p(Misstate_Risk, LAUDIT)] is significantly positive, indicating that higher 
misstatement risk is associated with higher fees. The total mediated path for misstatement risk 
[p(CON_KW, Misstate_Risk) x p(Misstate_Risk, LAUDIT)] is statistically significant at p<0.05, 
with a coefficient of -0.003, which implies that a one-standard-deviation increase in CON_KW 
results in a 0.003-standard-deviation decrease in audit fees through CON_KW’s impact on 
misstatement risk. This suggests that the proportion of the total effect attributable to 
misstatement risk is about 2% [=-0.003/(-0.089-0.049-0.003)]. Hence, while both auditor 
litigation risk and misstatement risk are significant channels through which conservatism affects 
audit fees, the analysis finds that litigation risk is a relatively more important channel when 
compared to misstatement risk.16 Table 5, Panel B and C report the results when the dependent 
variable is GCOs and auditor resignations, respectively. As with the audit fee tests, the two 
panels show that conservatism has both significant direct and indirect effects on GCO and 
resignation. They also provide similar evidence in terms of the relative importance of auditor 
litigation risk compared to misstatement risk. Specifically, in Panel B, the total mediated path 
through auditor litigation risk is -0.020, which is about 31% of the total effect of CON_KW on 
GCO [=-0.020/(-0.039-0.020-0.005)]. In Panel C, the total mediated path through auditor 
litigation risk is -0.025, which is about 26% of the total effect of CON_KW on auditor 
resignation [=-0.025/(-0.065-0.025-0.008)]. In both panels the total mediated path for 
misstatement risk is smaller, with about 8% of the total effect of CON_KW. This evidence is 
                                                 
16 The results also suggest that the direct path is a relatively more important channel than the indirect paths for audit 
fees. However, comparing the magnitude of the direct and indirect paths is subject to limitations because the 
comparison may be affected by measurement errors in our empirical proxies for the unobservable constructs of 
“auditor business risk” and by the possibility of omitted paths. Since the direct path, by construct, captures the 
residual effects not explained by our proxies for the indirect paths, the measurement errors and possible omitted 
paths are likely to induce an underestimation (overestimation) of the importance of the indirect (direct) path (Baron 
and Kenny 1986). 
 22 
consistent with Watts (2003), who argues that an important reason for auditors’ preference for 
conservative accounting is to mitigate litigation concern. 
Validating Auditor Litigation Risk and Misstatement Risk as Mediated Path 
Our path analysis uses ex ante proxies for auditor litigation risk and misstatement risk as 
mediated auditor business risk paths. To examine whether these paths are ex post valid, we examine 
the association between conservatism and the incidence of auditor litigation and financial 
restatements. Significant associations would provide corroborating evidence that they are important 
channels through which conservatism affects auditor-client contracting. We first perform the auditor 
litigation analysis using the following logistic model adapted from Shu (2000):  
LITIGt = α0 + α1 CONSVt-1 + α2 Assets t-1 + α3 Inventory t-1 + α4 Receivable t-1 + α5 ROA t-1+ α6 Current t-1 
+ α7 LEV t-1 + α8 Sales_Growth t-1 + α9 Return t-1 + α10 Volatility t-1+ α11 Beta t-1 + α12 Turnover t-1  
+ α13 Delist t-1 + α14 Tech_Dummy t-1 + α15 GCO t-1 + α16 BM t-1 + α17 Signed_DA t-1 
+ Year Dummies + et                             (5) 
 
The dependent variable (LITIG) is an indicator variable that equals one if the auditor is 
named as the defendant in a lawsuit during the year, and 0 otherwise. All independent variables 
are measured in the year prior to the lawsuit. A negative coefficient on CONSV is consistent with 
conservative financial reporting decreasing the likelihood of auditor litigation. We add two 
control variables to the original model in Shu (2000): BM, following the suggestion in KW, and 
Signed_DA because Heninger (2001) reports that auditor litigation is associated with upward 
manipulation of discretionary accruals.  
To test whether conservatism is associated with the incidence of accounting restatements 
we estimate the following model adapted from Cao et al. (2012):  
RESTATEt = a0 + a1 CONSVt-1 + a2 MV t + a3 Volatility t + a4 BM t + a5 LEV t + a6 ROA t + a7 LOSS t  
+ a8 BigN t + a9 MERGER t+ a10 FINANCE t + a11 NSEG t + a12 FOPS t + a13 Inv_Rec t  
+ a14 Return t + Year Dummies + et                                  (6) 
 
RESTATE equals one if the earnings for the firm-year or any quarter in the firm-year are 
subsequently restated downward, and 0 otherwise. Thus, RESTATE captures the misstatement 
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year that is subsequently restated. All independent variables are measured in the concurrent year 
except CONSV, which is lagged by one-year. A negative coefficient on CONSV is consistent 
with conservatism reducing the incidence of restatements.  
The sample for our auditor litigation test is from the Auditlegal database of Audit 
Analytics. After merging with CRSP and Compustat, our final sample includes 101 (147) 
lawsuits against auditors using CON_KW (CON_NOPA).17 The control firms have no auditor 
litigation. In the restatement test we only consider material incoming-decreasing financial 
restatements (defined as restatements that reduce income by more than a one million dollar) that 
do not trigger auditor litigation.18 The final sample consists of 1,126 (1,251) restatements for the 
test with CON_KW (CON_NOPA). The control firms include all non-restated firm-year 
observations during the sample period, which did not experience auditor litigation. 
Table 6, Panel A reports that the coefficients on CONSV are negative and statistically 
significant at p<0.01, consistent with client conservatism reducing auditor litigation risk. Panel B 
reports the results for the restatement tests. The coefficients on CONSV are significantly negative 
at p<0.01, consistent with conservative clients posing less misstatement risk. Thus, the analysis 
in Table 6 corroborates our conclusion that an important reason for auditors’ response to clients’ 
conditional conservatism is to mitigate auditor business risk.  
V. SENSITIVITY TESTS 
This section reports several robustness tests of our primary analysis. Because the results 
with the two proxies for conservatism are similar, we present the results based on the CON_KW 
                                                 
17 This is a reasonably large sample when compared to other auditor litigation studies. For example, Heninger 
(2001), Stice (1991), and Lys and Watts (1994) examine 67, 49, and 40 lawsuits against auditors, respectively. 
18 We examine only material income-decreasing restatements to capture restatements that are likely to significantly 
harm shareholders and thus auditors. Callen et al. (2006) find that the market response to income-increasing 
restatement announcements is not significantly different from zero. 
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for parsimony. The results of all of our sensitivity tests are summarized in Table 7. To conserve 
space, we do not report the coefficients on the control variables. 
Tests with Adjusted Conservatism 
KW show that a higher C_Score is associated with higher probabilities of litigation, longer 
investment cycles, higher idiosyncratic uncertainty, lower firm age, and higher information 
asymmetry. Thus, we perform sensitivity tests using adjusted conservatism (ADJ_CONKW) 
which is orthogonal to these variables. This estimation procedure is summarized in Appendix 3, 
and results in a smaller size due to additional data requirements. Panel A of Table 7 indicates the 
coefficients on ADJ_CONKW remain negative and significant in all tests.  
Joint Estimation of Auditor Decisions 
Because it is possible that auditors use a combined strategy in response to client 
conservatism, we jointly estimate all three models (models 1 through 3 above) using a system of 
equations. We perform this test with all common observations (n=17,010), without restrictions 
for distress or auditor switches. Panel B of Table 7 shows that the coefficients on CON_KW 
continue to be significantly negative in all three models, suggesting that conservatism is 
important even when the three decisions are jointly considered. 
Controlling for Corporate Governance  
To ensure that governance is not an omitted correlated variable, we repeat our tests after 
including several governance variables (following Lara et al. 2009): the G-index (Gindex) 
(Gompers et al. 2003); whether the CEO is chairman (Duality), proportion of executives on the 
board (Executive), and the number of board meetings during the year (Meeting).19 Table 7, Panel 
                                                 
19  The external governance data (Gindex) are obtained from Andrew Metrick’s web page and the internal 
governance data are from the Execucomp and Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) databases. Due to a 
large number of observations with missing governance data, we use the modified zero-order regressions suggested 
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C shows that the coefficients on CON_KW remain significantly negative in all tests. Other 
potential omitted governance variables include audit committee independence and expertise. 
Because SOX requires audit committees to be fully independent and to have at least one 
financial expert, we can partially control for the effect of audit committee attributes by 
conducting our analysis during the post-SOX period, when the attributes are more homogenous. 
Untabulated results indicate that the coefficient on CON_KW is negative and significant at 
p<0.01 for the fee and resignation tests, while it is negative but insignificant for the GCO test.  
Controlling for Discretionary Accruals 
Prior studies document that discretionary accruals (DA) are associated with auditor 
litigation (Heninger 2001), audit fees (Gul et al. 2003), and GCOs (Butler et al. 2004). Because 
DA potentially reflect conservatism, we repeat our tests after controlling for signed, absolute 
value, and income-increasing DA. Panels D and E of Table 7 report that the coefficients on 
CON_KW continue to be negative and significant at conventional levels in all tests.20  
The Effect of Big N Auditors 
We repeat our analysis separately for Big N and non-Big N auditor clients. The results 
reported in Panel F indicate that the coefficients on CONSV are all significant and negative for 
both Big N and non-Big N auditor clients, similar to the results for the full sample.21 
Other Robustness Checks 
We also perform several untabulated robustness checks. Following the suggestion in KW, 
our reported analysis includes controls for firm size, leverage, and the book-to-market ratio. 
                                                                                                                                                             
by Greene (2003). This method has fewer assumptions about missing values and substitutes a zero for missing 
values and adds an indicator variable coded one if the corresponding variable is missing. 
20 Specifically, of the 12 coefficients on CON_KW in Panels D and E, eight are significant at p<0.01 and four are 
significant at p<0.10. 
21 When we include an interaction term between CONSV and Big N indicator in the pooled sample to examine 
whether the effect of conservatism on auditor-client contracting outcome variables is more pronounced for Big N 
auditor, our untabulated results indicate that the sign of the interaction term is mixed across the tests. Thus, we find 
that there is no systematic pattern on the incremental effect of Big N auditor.  
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However, since CON_KW is likely to be correlated with the three variables, we check the 
variance-inflation factors (VIF) for the independent variables in each model. We find they are all 
less than 6, suggesting that multicollinearity is unlikely to influence our results. We also repeat 
our analysis excluding firm size, leverage, and the book-to-market ratio and find that the 
coefficients on CON_KW continue to be negative and significant at p<0.05 in all tests. In 
addition, we define size, book-to-market and leverage following the auditing literature, which 
sometimes differs from the definitions used in KW to estimate C_Score. Thus, we also repeat our 
analysis after measuring these variables as in KW. We find that the coefficients on CON_KW 
continue to be negative and significant at p<0.05 in all tests. 
Since GH argue that conservatism in one period can lead to non-conservatism in 
subsequent periods, we repeat our analyses after estimating CON_KW over the previous three 
years (CON_KW3). The results indicate that that the coefficients on CON_KW3 remain negative 
and significant at p<0.10 in all tests. We also control for internal control weakness (ICW) and 
earnings volatility (EVOL) in our main models.22 The results indicate that the coefficients on 
CON_KW are still significantly negative at p<0.10 in all tests.  
Since we use one-year lagged conservatism in our main models, we perform a sensitivity 
analysis using contemporaneous conservatism for the audit fee and GCO models. The results 
indicate that the coefficients on CON_KW remain significantly negative at p<0.05 in both tests. 
In addition, endogeneity concerns may be reduced during the first three quarters because 
quarterly reports are typically reviewed rather than audited. Thus, we repeat our analyses using 
CON_KW measured over the first three quarters (in the concurrent year for audit fee and GCOs, 
                                                 
22 ICW is defined 1 if the auditor issues an adverse opinion for internal control over financial reporting under SOX 
Section 404, and 0 otherwise. EVOL is the standard deviation of ROA over the three-year period. The sample size 
for this sensitivity test is smaller because ICW is available only in the post-SOX period and the calculation of EVOL 
further restricts the sample. 
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and in the previous year for resignations). We find that the coefficients on CON_KW remain 
negative and significant at p<0.01 for the audit fee and resignation tests, while the coefficient is 
negative and only significant in a one-tailed test for the GCO test (p=0.09). 
In our audit fee test, we note that the correlation between CON_KW and firm size (MV) is 
relatively high (r=-0.32), which potentially biases toward the negative association between 
conservatism and audit fees. To alleviate this concern we split the sample into five groups based 
on firm size, in an attempt to make client size similar across observations. We then estimate the 
audit fee model for each group and find that the coefficient on CON_KW continues to be 
negative and significant at p<0.05 in four of the five groups.  
We also repeat our audit fee tests after removing firms with non-clean opinions; and 
because we only include firms that receive GCOs for the first time in the GCO test, we also 
repeat our GCO tests after including firms that receive multiple GCOs. In addition, we repeat our 
resignation tests using firms that do not change auditors (n=22,407) as the control group, instead 
of firms that dismiss their auditor. We exclude Disagree and Rep_Events from the model since 
they are relevant only to auditor-switching firms. Finally, we include industry fixed effects in the 
GCO and resignation models. In all of these tests we continue to find that CON_KW remains 
significantly negative at p<0.05. 
Finally, we examine if the effects of conservatism on auditor-client contracting are greater 
when CEOs are more likely to report conservatively. Following LaFond and Roychowdhury 
(2008), we construct a variable, CONSV_CEO, which equals one if CEO ownership is lower than 
the sample median and zero otherwise. LaFond and Roychowdhury (2008) argue that as 
managerial ownership declines, the severity of agency problems increase, increasing the demand 
for conservatism. We then repeat our main analyses after including CONSV_CEO and 
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CONSV_CEO* CON_KW in each model. Untabulated results show that the interaction term is 
significantly negative for the fee and GCO tests at p<0.05, and negative but insignificant at 
conventional levels for the resignation test. Thus, this finding suggests that the effects of 
conservatism on audit fees and GCOs are greater when CEOs are more likely to report 
conservatively. 
VI. TESTS WITH UNCONDITIONAL CONSERVATISM 
As previously discussed, conditional conservatism requires a higher degree of verification 
for the recognition of gains than for the recognition of losses. Unconditional conservatism, in 
contrast, biases earnings downward, but is applied irrespective of whether the news is easily 
verified (Qiang 2007). It is unclear, however, whether auditors are likely to respond to 
unconditional conservatism as they do to conditional conservatism. This is because unconditional 
conservatism during the current period can reduce conditional conservatism in future periods 
(Beaver and Ryan 2005). For example, firms that take excessive depreciation in the current 
period are less likely to take asset impairment write-downs in future periods. Further, 
unconditionally conservative earnings in the current period can lead to earnings overstatements 
in subsequent periods. This is the case, for example, when excessive loss reserves in the current 
period reverse in future periods they overstate future earnings. Several studies support this 
concern by finding that measures of unconditional conservatism are negatively associated with 
measures of conditional conservatism (Beaver and Ryan 2005).23 In addition, because the level 
of unconditional conservatism is largely determined by accounting standards (e.g., expensing 
                                                 
23 While Qiang (2007) reports that auditor litigation risk induces both conditional and unconditional conservatism, 
Ettredge et al. (2012b) suggests that this may be because her proxy for auditor litigation risk (Big N membership) is 
very indirect. 
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R&D expenditures) or by legitimate accounting choices (e.g., LIFO versus FIFO inventory 
method), it is unlikely to be associated with auditor business risk. 
In this section, we explore the effects of unconditional conservatism on auditors’ strategic 
responses. We begin by repeating our tests of audit fees, GCOs, and resignations with two 
proxies for unconditional conservatism. One is from Penman and Zhang (2002), based on the 
LIFO reserve, R&D, and advertising expenses over the previous five years. The other is from 
Beaver and Ryan (2000), who estimate a conservatism bias component by regressing the book-
to-market ratio on current and lagged returns in the prior six years. We use the firm-specific 
coefficient estimate multiplied by negative one as our second proxy. Table 8, Panel A reports 
that neither proxy is related to GCO and auditor resignation, and only the Beaver and Ryan 
(2000) measure is significantly negatively associated with audit fees. Although not tabulated, 
when we include a conditional measure (CON_KW) in each model, we find that while CON_KW 
continues to be significantly negative, the unconditional conservatism measures are mostly 
insignificant. Thus, we do not find a robust association between the proxies for unconditional 
conservatism and the strategies auditors use in dealing with engagement risk.  
To explore why auditors do not strategically respond to unconditional conservatism, we 
repeat our tests of auditor litigation and restatement after replacing CONSV in equations (5) and 
(6) with the two unconditional conservatism measures. Table 8, Panel B shows that neither of 
our unconditional conservatism proxies is associated with auditor litigation or restatements. 
Thus, auditors’ failure to strategically respond to unconditional conservatism is ex post 
consistent with the fact that unconditional conservatism does not affect auditor business risk.    
VII. CONCLUSION 
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We examine the role of client conservatism in formulating auditor-client contracting. Our 
empirical tests find that auditors of more conservative clients charge lower audit fees, issue 
fewer GCOs, and resign less frequently, consistent with client conservatism reducing 
engagement risk. Using path analysis, we find that conservatism has a negative direct effect on 
the outcome variables. Further, auditor business risk captured by auditor litigation risk and 
misstatement risk are significant mediated paths that explain the association between 
conservatism and the outcome variables. We also find that client conservatism is negatively 
associated with the incidence of auditor litigation and restatements, suggesting that auditors’ ex 
ante concerns about the effects of conservatism on auditor business risk are valid.  
We extend the literature by examining how conservatism affects auditor-client contracting. 
Our evidence suggests that conservatism is an important factor that influences the auditors’ 
strategic contracting decisions. The results are potentially of interest to managers, auditors, 
regulators, and audit committees. Managers may be interested because our results suggest that a 
benefit of conservative accounting is that it reduces fees, unfavorable audit opinions, and the 
incidence of auditor resignations. Auditors may gain insights from our study because they 
actively manage engagement risk, and we find support for the notion that conservatism is 
associated with lower inherent risk and auditor business risk. Moreover, given the significant 
variation in conservatism among public firms, regulators and audit committees may benefit by 
better understanding the effects of conservatism on auditor behavior and auditor-client relations.  
Like most studies, however, our analysis is subject to caveats. One is that although we do 
our best to control for reverse causality and omitted correlated variables, we cannot completely 
rule out these threats. Another is that while we consider ex ante auditor litigation and 
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misstatement risks as two mediated paths, these two risks are not necessarily independent, which 
limits our interpretation of relative importance of the path coefficients.   
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Appendix 1: Variable Definitions 
 
Dependent and test variables 
LAUDIT = log of audit fees; 
OPIN = 1 if the firm receives a going concern opinion for the first time, and 0 
otherwise; 
RESIGN = 1 if the auditor resigns, and 0 otherwise (dismissed); 
CON_KW = annual decile rank of conservatism score (C_Score) developed by Khan and 
Watts (2009), scaled from 0 to 1, with higher values indicating higher 
conservatism. A detail of C_Score estimation is provided in Appendix 2; 
CON_NOPA = annual decile rank of non-operating accruals (NOPA), scaled from 0 and 1. 
NOPA is the three-year average of non-operating accruals as in Givoly and 
Hayn (2000), Higher values of CON_NOPA indicate higher conservatism. 
NOPA is computed as follows (all items deflated by beginning total assets):  
NOPA = [(Net Income + Depreciation) − Cash flow from operations] − (Δ 
Accounts receivable + Δ Inventories + Δ Prepaid expenses − Δ Accounts 
payable − Δ Taxes payable); 
LITIG = 1 if the auditor is named as the defendant in the lawsuit, and 0 otherwise; 
RESTATE = 1 if the earnings for the firm-year or any quarter in the firm-year are 
subsequently restated downward, and 0 otherwise. In other words, RESTATE 
captures the misstatement year. 
Control variables 
Assets = log of total assets; 
Inventory = inventories deflated by total assets; 
Receivable = receivables deflated by total assets; 
ROA = income before extraordinary items deflated by total assets; 
Current = current assets divided by current liabilities; 
LEV =  total debts to equity ratio; 
Sales_Growth = growth in sales; 
Return = the compounded stock return over the fiscal year; 
Volatility = the standard deviation of the residual from the market model over the fiscal 
year; 
Beta = the slope coefficient of a regression of daily stock returns on equally weighted 
market returns over the fiscal year; 
Turnover = the proportion of shares traded at least once during the fiscal year, computed 
as in Shu (2000); 
Delist = 1 if the firm is delisted due to financial difficulties within the next year, and 0 
otherwise; 
Tech_Dummy = 1 if the firm is in a high-tech industry, and 0 otherwise. The classification of 
high-tech industries follows from Shu (2000); 
GCO = 1 if the firm receives a going concern opinion, and 0 otherwise; 
BM = book-to-market ratio;  
Signed_DA = performance-adjusted signed discretionary accruals obtained by subtracting 
from each firm’s abnormal accrual the median abnormal accrual from the 
corresponding ROA-industry decile to which the firm belongs. Discretionary 
accrual is estimated by modified Jones model for each year and each two-
digit SIC code industry with minimum 10 observations; 
MV = log of market capitalization; 
Loss =  1 if the firm reports a loss and 0 otherwise; 
BigN = 1 if the firm is audited by a Big 4 or Big 5 audit firm, and 0 otherwise; 
Merger = 1 if the firm is engaged in a merger or acquisition, and 0 otherwise; 
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Finance = 1 if long term debt or number of shares increased by at least 10%, and 0 
otherwise;  
NSEG =  the number of business segments; 
FOPS =  1 if the firm has a foreign operation, and 0 otherwise; 
Inv_Rec = sum of inventories and receivables, divided by beginning total assets; 
Quick = current assets minus inventories, divided by current liabilities; 
SPITEM = 1 if the firm reports a special item, and 0 otherwise; 
Pension = 1 if the pension assets or periodic pension cost is greater than $1 million, and 
0 otherwise; 
Busy = 1 if the fiscal year end is December, and 0 otherwise; 
ZScore = Zmijewski’s (1984) bankruptcy score; 
Age = natural logarithm of the age of the firm in a given year, measured as the 
number of years with return history on CRSP; 
CLEV = change in LEV during the year; 
LLoss = 1 if the firm reports a loss for the previous year, and 0 otherwise; 
Investment = cash, cash equivalents, and short- and long-term investment securities 
deflated by total assets; 
Cashflow = operating cash flows deflated by total assets; 
Future_Finance = 1 if long term debt or number of shares increased by at least 10% in the 
following year, and 0 otherwise;  
Asset_Growth =  growth in assets; 
Abs_DA = absolute values of performance-adjusted discretionary accruals; 
Clean = 1 if the auditor issues a clean, unqualified audit opinion, and 0 otherwise; 
Tenure = auditor tenure in years; 
Cash =  cash deflated by total assets; 
Disagree = 1 if the 8-K filing discloses an accounting disagreement with the incumbent 
auditor, and 0 otherwise; 
Rep_Event = 1 if the 8-K filing discloses a reportable event, and 0 otherwise; 
Industry 
Dummies 
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  Client 
Conservatism 
Outcome Variables:  
Fees, Going concern 
opinions, Resignations 
 
Auditor Business Risk 
proxied by Litigation and 
Misstatement Risk 
This Figure depicts the direct and indirect paths through which accounting conservatism is expected to affect our 
outcome variables (fees, going concern opinions, and resignations). We expect conservatism to directly affect the 
outcome variables through its effect on inherent risk, and indirectly affect the outcome variables through its effect 
on auditor business risk (as proxied by mediating variables of expected litigation and misstatement risk). 
Expected auditor litigation risk is estimated using the annual decile rank of Shu’s (2000) score; and expected 
misstatement risk is estimated using the average annual decile rank of Dechow et al.’s (2011) F-score, Beneish’s 
(1999) M-score, and Dechow and Dichev’s (2002) accrual quality. The following models are estimated in the 
path analysis: 
 
DepVart = β0 + β1 CONSVt-1 + β2 ShuScoret + β3 Misstate_Riskt + Controls + et                        
ShuScoret = α0 + α1 CONSVt-1+ et                     
Misstate_Risk t = δ 0 + δ 1 CONSVt-1+ et             
        
The dependent variables (DepVar) in the first equation above are our outcome variables (i.e., audit fees, GCOs or 
resignations). Controls are relevant control variables from the fees, GCO, and resignation models. The path 
coefficient β1 is the magnitude of the direct path from conservatism to the outcome variables.  The path 
coefficient α1 (δ1) is the magnitude of the path coefficient from client conservatism to auditor litigation risk 
(misstatement risk). The path coefficient β2 (β3) is the magnitude of the path from litigation risk (misstatement 
risk) to the outcome variables. The path coefficient α1*β2 (δ1*β3) measures the magnitude of the indirect path 
from conservatism to the DepVar mediated through auditor litigation risk (misstatement risk). The predicted signs 
of the path coefficients are included in parentheses. 
α1 and δ1 (-) β2 and β3 (+) 
 
 β1 (-) 
 Client Inherent Risk 
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Table 1: Analysis of Conservatism and Audit Fees 
 









2000 1,999 2,688  Agriculture 117 177 
2001 2,503 3,407  Chemicals 758 1,180 
2002 2,730 4,193  Computers 4,855 7,325 
2003 2,797 4,391  Durable manufacturers 7,276 10,590 
2004 2,860 4,379  Extractive 1,075 1,871 
2005 2,725 4,219  Food 681 927 
2006 2,632 4,011  Mining and Construction 515 1,170 
2007 2,510 3,797  Pharmaceuticals 1,672 3,184 
2008 2,270 3,578  Retail 3,266 4,305 
2009 2,356 3,518  Services 3,151 4,901 
2010 2,366 3,356  Textiles and printing/publishing 1,399 1,816 
    Transportation 1,778 2,929 
    Utilities 1,205 1,162 
Total 27,748 41,537   27,748 41,537 
 
Panel B: Descriptive Statistics  
 CON_KW sample CON_NOPA sample 
 
Mean Q1 Median Q3 Std Dev Mean Q1 Median Q3 Std Dev 
LAUDIT 13.36 12.38 13.34 14.22 1.30 12.91 11.81 12.86 13.93 1.49 
CONSV 0.50 0.22 0.56 0.78 0.32 0.50 0.22 0.56 0.78 0.32 
MV 6.17 4.78 6.12 7.48 1.92 5.18 3.42 5.23 6.91 2.52 
Quick 2.44 0.99 1.56 2.75 2.80 2.37 0.83 1.41 2.59 3.16 
Loss 0.30 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.46 0.43 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.50 
ROA -0.01 -0.02 0.03 0.07 0.22 -0.32 -0.14 0.02 0.07 1.57 
LEV 0.62 0.01 0.27 0.75 1.15 0.49 0.00 0.17 0.70 2.07 
Inv_Rec 0.25 0.11 0.23 0.36 0.18 0.26 0.09 0.22 0.38 0.20 
BM 0.62 0.30 0.50 0.77 0.48 0.57 0.21 0.44 0.78 0.52 
NSEG 6.50 3.00 4.00 9.00 4.83 5.71 3.00 3.00 9.00 4.53 
SPITEM 0.62 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.49 0.61 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.49 
FOPS 0.28 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.45 0.26 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.44 
Merger 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.40 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.37 
Finance 0.34 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.47 0.37 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.48 
Pension 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.25 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.30 
BigN 0.83 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.37 0.70 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.46 
GCO 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.32 
Busy 0.67 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.47 0.68 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.47 
 
The sample period is 2000-2010 and detailed definitions of the variables are provided in Appendix 1. Industries are defined as in 
the classification in Frankel et al. (2002), which is based on the following SIC codes: agriculture (0100–0999), mining and 
construction (1000–1999, excluding 1300–1399), food (2000–2111), textiles and printing/publishing (2200–2799), chemicals 
(2800–2824, 2840–2899), pharmaceuticals (2830–2836), extractive (2900–2999, 1300–1399), durable manufacturers (3000–
3999, excluding 3570–3579 and 3670–3679), transportation (4000–4899), utilities (4900–4999), retail (5000–5999), services 





Table 1 (continued) 
 
Panel C: OLS Regression of Audit Fee Model 
 
LAUDIT =γ0 + γ1 CONSV + γ2 MV + γ3 Quick + γ4 Loss + γ5 ROA + γ6 LEV+ γ7 Inv_Rec + γ8 BM + γ9 NSEG  
+ γ10 SPITEM + γ11 FOPS + γ12 Merger + γ13 Finance + γ14 Pension + γ15 BigN + γ16 GCO + γ17 Busy  
+ Industry & Year Dummies + e 
 
Variable Predicted Sign 
CONSV = CON_KW 
         Coef.                  t-statistic 
CONSV = CON_NOPA 
Coef.               t-statistic 
CONSV - -0.293 -7.42*** -0.097 -5.30*** 
MV + 0.441 46.94*** 0.360 70.84*** 
Quick - -0.041 -15.36*** -0.052 -23.79*** 
Loss + 0.152 10.01*** 0.229 17.96*** 
ROA - -0.190 -5.08*** -0.060 -13.89*** 
LEV + 0.133 20.37*** 0.020 7.40*** 
Inv_Rec + 0.725 13.56*** 0.470 10.84*** 
BM - -0.448 -26.35*** -0.000 -2.85*** 
NSEG + 0.027 14.31*** 0.038 18.83*** 
SPITEM + 0.233 20.26*** 0.355 33.59*** 
FOPS + 0.129 7.04*** 0.176 9.65*** 
Merger + 0.098 7.86*** 0.112 8.94*** 
Finance + 0.039 4.03*** 0.079 8.56*** 
Pension + 0.088 3.97*** 0.019 0.98 
BigN + 0.298 13.84*** 0.603 31.43*** 
GCO + 0.124 2.39*** 0.075 2.94*** 
Busy + 0.065 3.56*** 0.082 4.81*** 
Intercept ? 9.870 107.75*** 10.344 176.88*** 
Industry & Year 
Dummies  YES YES 
n  27,748 41,537 
Adj R2 (%)  79.09 76.52 
 
The variables used in the regression model are as defined in Appendix 1. We run the OLS regression clustered by firm. For each 
variable, we report the OLS regression coefficient, followed by the robust t-statistic. To conserve space, we do not report the 




Table 2: Analysis of Conservatism and Going Concern Opinions 
 
Panel A: Sample distribution by year and industry 
 CON_KW sample CON_NOPA sample   CON_KW 
sample 
CON_NOPA 
sample Year n # of GCOs n # of GCOs  Industry 
2000 987 66 1,296 147  Agriculture 32 41 
2001 1,113 53 1,363 144  Chemicals 173 221 
2002 985 28 1,429 154  Computers 2,326 3,006 
2003 899 18 1,267 74  Durable manufacturers 2,412 3,138 
2004 809 16 1,058 77  Extractive 303 416 
2005 750 20 1,019 76  Food 135 174 
2006 729 20 971 65  Mining and Construction 188 259 
2007 705 26 932 85  Pharmaceuticals 1,194 1,755 
2008 807 34 1,142 107  Retail 825 1,142 











 Textiles and 
printing/publishing 329 440 
      Transportation 426 645 
      Utilities 138 146 
Total 9,284 302 12,462 1,052   9,284 12,462 
 
Panel B: Descriptive Statistics  
 CON_KW sample CON_NOPA sample 
 
Mean Q1 Median Q3 Std Dev Mean Q1 Median Q3 Std Dev 
OPIN 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.18 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.28 
CONSV 0.50 0.22 0.44 0.78 0.32 0.51 0.22 0.56 0.78 0.31 
Assets 5.12 3.96 5.04 6.11 1.61 4.64 3.37 4.60 5.80 1.83 
Zscore -3.29 -4.32 -3.52 -2.55 1.32 -3.00 -4.18 -3.29 -2.18 1.58 
Age 2.53 2.08 2.48 2.94 0.64 2.51 2.08 2.48 2.94 0.61 
Beta 1.00 0.45 0.94 1.46 0.69 0.93 0.39 0.85 1.38 0.69 
Return 0.01 -0.42 -0.13 0.24 0.68 0.07 -0.50 -0.16 0.26 1.12 
LEV 0.69 0.00 0.17 0.76 1.39 0.92 0.00 0.20 0.87 2.00 
CLEV 0.16 -0.01 0.00 0.14 1.11 0.37 -0.01 0.00 0.19 2.11 
LLoss 0.62 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.49 0.68 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.47 
Investment 0.30 0.06 0.21 0.49 0.27 0.30 0.06 0.21 0.49 0.28 
Cashflow -0.04 -0.10 -0.01 0.05 0.39 -0.06 -0.13 -0.01 0.05 0.42 
Future_Finance 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.50 0.49 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.50 
BigN 0.77 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.42 0.71 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.45 
BM 0.74 0.31 0.58 0.97 0.62 0.87 0.29 0.59 1.07 0.98 
 
The sample for the going concern opinion test consists of financially distressed firms, defined as firms that report either negative 
net income or negative operating cash flows during the current fiscal year. The sample period is 2000-2010. 302 (1,052) firms 
receive going concern opinions for the first time in the CON_KW (CON_NOPA) sample. Detailed definitions of the variables are 
provided in Appendix 1. Industries are defined as in the classification in Frankel et al. (2002), which is based on the following 
SIC codes: agriculture (0100–0999), mining and construction (1000–1999, excluding 1300–1399), food (2000–2111), textiles 
and printing/publishing (2200–2799), chemicals (2800–2824, 2840–2899), pharmaceuticals (2830–2836), extractive (2900–2999, 
1300–1399), durable manufacturers (3000–3999, excluding 3570–3579 and 3670–3679), transportation (4000–4899), utilities 





Table 2 (continued)  
 
Panel C: Logistic Regression of Going Concern Opinion Model 
 
OPIN = λο + λ1 CONSV + λ2Assets + λ3 ZScore + λ4Beta + λ5Return + λ6LEV + λ7CLEV  
    + λ8LLoss + λ9Investment + λ10Cashflow + λ11Future_Finance + λ12BigN + λ13BM + Year Dummies + e 
 
Variable Predicted Sign 
CONSV = CON_KW 
         Coef.             Wald statistic 
CONSV = CON_NOPA 
Coef           Wald statistic 
CONSV - -0.863 3.86** -0.222 2.27 
Assets - -0.378 7.89*** -0.493 125.55*** 
ZScore + 0.439 115.36*** 0.415 231.21*** 
Beta + 0.369 7.14*** 0.006 0.01 
Return - -0.227 2.20 -0.087 2.36 
LEV + -0.023 0.22 0.025 0.89 
CLEV + -0.018 0.14 0.001 0.01 
LLoss + 0.693 17.76*** 0.637 38.31*** 
Investment - -2.133 35.87*** -1.946 67.15*** 
Cashflow - -1.088 16.25*** -1.302 32.42*** 
Future_Finance - -0.529 12.72*** -0.402 24.26*** 
BigN + 0.170 0.86 0.154 1.89 
BM - -0.456 9.15*** -0.093 4.12** 
Intercept ? 0.730 0.76 0.651 9.78*** 
Year Dummies  YES YES 
      
n  9,284 12,462 
Wald-statistic  389.56 843.86 
Pseudo R2 (%)  20.93 30.35 
Percent 
Concordant 
 80.8 84.6 
 
The variables used in the regression model are as defined in Appendix 1. We run the logistic regression clustered by firm. For 
each variable, we report the logistic regression coefficient, followed by the robust Wald statistic. To conserve space, we do not 
report the coefficient estimates for the year dummies. ‘*’, ‘**’, and ‘***’ denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels (two-
tailed), respectively. 
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Table 3: Analysis of Conservatism and Auditor Resignations 
 
Panel A: Sample distribution by year and industry 
 CON_KW sample CON_NOPA sample  CON_KW 
sample 
CON_NOPA 




2000 27 4 34 4 Agriculture - 1 
2001 742 25 894 44 Chemicals 67 94 
2002 189 42 307 72 Computers 397 536 
2003 303 80 404 107 Durable manufacturers 774 1,003 
2004 314 79 380 110 Extractive 101 139 
2005 231 54 298 85 Food 56 70 
2006 181 41 219 54 Mining and Construction 40 51 
2007 115 14 160 23 Pharmaceuticals 129 189 
2008 120 25 176 34 Retail 256 329 












printing/publishing 102 123 
     Transportation 144 205 
     Utilities 107 91 
Total 2,404 418 3,117 611  2,404 3,117 
 
 
Panel B: Descriptive Statistics  
  CON_KW sample CON_NOPA sample 
 
Mean Q1 Median Q3 Std Dev Mean Q1 Median Q3 Std Dev 
RESIGN 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.38 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.40 
CONSV 0.50 0.22 0.56 0.78 0.32 0.49 0.22 0.44 0.78 0.31 
Asset_Growth 0.09 -0.07 0.03 0.15 0.35 0.07 -0.11 0.02 0.15 0.42 
Abs_DA 0.07 0.02 0.04 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.02 0.05 0.11 0.14 
Inv_Rec 0.28 0.11 0.24 0.40 0.20 0.29 0.11 0.25 0.41 0.21 
GCO 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.15 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.28 
Tenure 8.92 3.00 7.00 12.00 7.64 8.59 3.00 7.00 11.00 7.39 
ROA -0.04 -0.04 0.02 0.06 0.25 -0.13 -0.12 0.01 0.06 0.42 
Loss 0.36 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.48 0.46 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.50 
LEV 0.45 0.01 0.30 0.82 0.50 0.29 0.00 0.27 0.86 1.15 
Cash 0.13 0.02 0.07 0.17 0.16 0.14 0.02 0.07 0.19 0.17 
Disagree 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.15 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.15 
Rep_Event 0.14 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.35 0.15 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.35 
BigN 0.81 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.39 0.76 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.43 
Assets 5.65 4.26 5.45 6.85 1.95 5.21 3.63 4.99 6.54 2.14 
Merger 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.40 0.18 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.38 
BM 0.66 0.31 0.55 0.85 0.50 0.67 0.27 0.53 0.89 1.48 
 
The sample of the auditor resignation test consists of auditor switching firms over the period 2000-2010 and excludes former 
Andersen clients. Of these auditor changes, 418 (611) are resignations for the CON_KW (CON_NOPA) sample, while the 
remaining changes are client-initiated. Detailed definitions of the variables are provided in Appendix 1.  Industries are defined as 
in the classification in Frankel et al. (2002), which is based on the following SIC codes: agriculture (0100–0999), mining and 
construction (1000–1999, excluding 1300–1399), food (2000–2111), textiles and printing/publishing (2200–2799), chemicals 
(2800–2824, 2840–2899), pharmaceuticals (2830–2836), extractive (2900–2999, 1300–1399), durable manufacturers (3000–
3999, excluding 3570–3579 and 3670–3679), transportation (4000–4899), utilities (4900–4999), retail (5000–5999), services 
(7000–8999, excluding 7370–7379) and computers (3570–3579, 3670–3679, 7370–7379). 
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Table 3 (continued) 
Panel C: Logistic Regression of Auditor Resignation Model  
 
RESIGN = β0 + β1 CONSV + β2 Asset_Growth + β3 Abs_DA + β4 Inv_Rec + β5 GCO + β6 Clean + β7 Tenure  
+ β8 ROA + β9 Loss + β10 LEV + β11 Cash + β12 Disagree + β13 Rep_Event + β14 BigN + β15Assets + β16 Merger  
+ β17 BM + Year Dummies + e 
 
Variable Predicted Sign 
CONSV = CON_KW 
         Coef.             Wald statistic 
CONSV = CON_NOPA 
Coef           Wald statistic 
CONSV - -1.434 24.35*** -0.671 16.82*** 
Asset_Growth + 0.338 3.30* 0.118 0.85 
Abs_DA + 1.089 2.58 0.847 3.80** 
Inv_Rec + 0.525 2.98* 0.107 0.17 
GCO + 0.488 2.19 0.742 16.42*** 
Tenure - -0.039 12.18*** -0.034 14.60*** 
ROA - -0.299 1.17 0.008 0.00 
Loss + -0.072 0.23 0.170 2.05 
LEV + 1.184 67.96*** 0.248 6.75*** 
Cash - -1.051 6.17*** -0.915 7.90*** 
Disagree + -0.087 0.05 0.261 0.78 
Rep_Event + 0.933 35.03*** 0.766 32.10*** 
BigN - -0.975 47.67*** -0.936 64.41*** 
Assets - -0.347 28.46*** -0.081 4.58** 
Merger ? -0.085 0.23 -0.113 0.57 
BM - 0.042 0.08 -0.089 5.88** 
Intercept ? 1.111 6.20*** -0.184 0.50 
Year Dummies  YES YES 
    
n  2,404 3,117 
Wald-statistic  207.08 244.71 
Pseudo R2 (%)  18.65 15.25 
Percent 
Concordant 
 73.9 72.5 
 
The variables used in the regression model are as defined in Appendix 1. We run the logistic regression clustered by firm. For 
each variable, we report the regression coefficient, followed by the robust Wald statistic. ‘*’, ‘**’, and ‘***’ denote significance 
at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels (two-tailed), respectively. 
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Table 4: Tests for Endogeneity 
 
Panel A: Durbin-Wu-Hausman Test   
 
 CONSV = CON_KW CONSV = CON_NOPA 
 
























variables YES YES YES YES YES YES 
       
n 27,713 9,250 2,261 41,471 12,429 2,936 
R-square (%) 79.16 21.72 19.35 76.88 30.51 18.87 
 
Panel B: Two-stage Instrumental Variables Estimation 
 
 CONSV  =  Predict_CON_KW CONSV  =  Predict_CON_NOPA 
 























Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES 
       
n 27,713 9,250 2,261 41,471 12,429 2,936 
R-square (%) 78.17 21.36 19.43 76.87 30.46 15.25 





























Panel C: Change Analysis for Audit Fee Test 
 







∆Controls YES YES 
n 22,012 35,044 
R-square (%) 21.52 12.54 
Panel A reports the result of the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test to examine whether each model is affected by the endogeneity of 
conservatism. In the first stage, we regress conservatism on our instrumental variables, Cycle and Age, and other explanatory 
variables. In the second stage, we regress our dependent variables (i.e., fee, GCO, and resignation) on the residual (RES) from the 
first stage regression along with conservatism and the other explanatory variables. A significant coefficient on RES rejects the 
exogeneity of conservatism. The panel reports the result of the second stage of the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test. Panel B reports the 
result of the two-stage instrumental variable approach which uses the predicted value of conservatism (Predict_CON_KW or 
Predict_CON_NOPA) in the second stage model to control for the potential endogeneity associated with conservatism. The 
partial F-statistics in the first stage test the strength of our instrumental variables (Larcker and Rusticus 2010). The Hansen’s J-
statistics test the overidentification of our instrumental variables. Panel C reports the result of the change analysis for the audit 
fee test where we regress the change in audit fees on the changes in the continuous variables in the audit fee model. The robust t-
statistic (Wald statistic) is reported in the parenthesis below the coefficient estimate for the audit fee test (going concern opinion 
and resignation tests). ‘*’, ‘**’, and ‘***’ denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels (two-tailed), respectively. 
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Table 5: Path analysis 
 
Panel A: Audit Fee Test 
 
 CON_KW CON_NOPA 
Direct Path  
P(CONSV, LAUDIT)  = ?̂?1 -0.089 (-9.73) *** -0.019 (-4.14) *** 
   
Mediated Path for auditor litigation risk   
P(CONSV, ShuScore) = ∝�1 -0.583 
(-109.45) *** -0.020 (-3.34) *** 





Total mediated path for auditor litigation risk (= ∝�1 * ?̂?2) -0.049 (-15.59) *** -0.003 (-4.33) *** 
   
Mediated Path for misstatement risk   
P(CONSV, Misstate_Risk) = 𝛿�1 -0.197 (-25.47) *** -0.030 (-4.13) ** 





Total mediated path for misstatement risk (= 𝛿�1 * ?̂?3) -0.003 (-2.20) ** -0.001 (-2.09) ** 
   
Controls Yes Yes 
 n 15,375 18,491 
 
 
Panel B: Going Concern Opinion Test 
 
 CON_KW CON_NOPA 
Direct Path  
P(CONSV, OPIN) = ?̂?1 -0.039 (-2.57) *** -0.002 (-1.14) 
   
Mediated Path for auditor litigation risk   
P(CONSV, ShuScore)  = ∝�1 -0.503 
(-45.87) *** -0.022 (-1.73) * 





Total mediated path for auditor litigation risk (= ∝�1 * ?̂?2) -0.020 (-3.63) *** -0.001 (-1.76) * 
   
Mediated Path for misstatement risk   
P(CONSV, Misstate_Risk) = 𝛿�1 -0.189 (-13.31) *** -0.035 (-2.81) *** 





Total mediated path for misstatement risk (= 𝛿�1 * ?̂?3) -0.005 (-2.02) ** -0.001 (-1.25) 
   
 Controls Yes Yes 
 n 4,653 6,413 
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Table 5 (continued) 
 
Panel C: Auditor Resignation Test 
 
 CON_KW CON_NOPA 
Direct Path  
P(CONSV, Resign) = ?̂?1 -0.065 (-1.84) * -0.071 (-3.09) *** 
   
Mediated Path for auditor litigation risk   
P(CONSV, ShuScore) = ∝�1 -0.428 
(-19.12) *** -0.020 (-2.82) *** 





Total mediated path for auditor litigation risk (= ∝�1 * ?̂?2) -0.025 (-2.60) *** -0.003 (-2.11) ** 
   
Mediated Path for misstatement risk   
P(CONSV, Misstate_ Risk) = 𝛿�1 -0.093 (-3.43) *** -0.047 (-1.94) * 





Total mediated path for misstatement risk (= 𝛿�1 * ?̂?3) -0.008 (-2.38) ** -0.002 (-1.33) 
   
Controls Yes Yes 
 n 1,328 1,679 
 
This table reports the results from a path analysis that examines the effect of conservatism on auditor fees, GCOs, and 
resignations through ex ante auditor litigation risk and misstatement risk. p(X1,X2) stands for the standardized path coefficient. 
The t-statistics of the coefficients are reported in parentheses. The two mediated paths are expected auditor litigation risk, as 
proxied by annual decile rank of Shu’s (2000) score; and expected misstatement risk, as proxied by the average annual decile 
rank of Dechow et al.’s (2011) F-score, Beneish’s (1999) M-score, and Dechow and Dichev’s (2002) accrual quality. See Price et 
al. (2011, 760-762) for detailed definitions of the misstatement risk proxies. We estimate the following model: 
 
DepVart = β0 + β1 CONSVt-1 + β2 ShuScoret + β3 Misstate_Riskt + Controls + et       
ShuScoret = α0 + α1 CONSVt-1+ et            
Misstate_Riskt = δ 0 + δ 1 CONSVt-1+ et        
 
The dependent variable (DepVar) is the auditor-client contracting outcome variable measured by audit fees, GCOs, or 
resignations in Panels A, B, and C respectively. The path coefficient β1 is the magnitude of the direct path from conservatism to 
the dependent variable. The path coefficient α1*β2 (δ1*β3) is the magnitude of the indirect path from conservatism to the 
dependent variable mediated through auditor litigation risk (misstatement risk). The significance of the indirect effect is 
estimated using the Sobel (1982) test statistics. The table reports the path coefficients of interest. ‘*’, ‘**’, and ‘***’ denote 
significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels (two-tailed), respectively.  
 




Table 6: Effect of Conservatism on Auditor Litigation and Restatement 
 
 
Panel A: Logistic Regression of Auditor Litigation Model 
 
LITIG = α0+ α1 CONSV + α2 Assets + α3 Inventory + α4 Receivable + α5 ROA+ α6 Current + α7 LEV  
+ α8 Sales_Growth + α9 Return + α10 Volatility + α11 Beta+ α12 Turnover+ α13 Delist+ α14 Tech_Dummy 
+ α15 GCO + α16 BM + α17 Signed_DA +Year Dummies + e 
 
Variable Predicted Sign 
CONSV = CON_KW 
         Coef.             Wald statistic 
CONSV = CON_NOPA 
Coef           Wald statistic 
CONSV - -1.510 8.21*** -0.862 12.13*** 
Assets + 0.393 17.70*** 0.210 21.95*** 
Inventory + -0.094 0.01 -0.045 0.01 
Receivable + 1.852 7.30*** 1.012 1.47 
ROA - -0.736 2.68* -0.838 3.76** 
Current - -0.238 5.28** -0.046 1.61 
LEV + 1.950 5.87** 0.316 15.64*** 
Sales_Growth + 0.150 0.20 0.044 0.06 
Return - -0.293 0.73 -0.156 0.80 
Volatility + 4.548 0.93 2.591 4.52** 
Beta + 0.145 0.21 0.229 1.95 
Turnover + 2.336 6.92*** 2.834 29.49*** 
Delist + 0.434 0.10 -0.850 0.63 
Tech_Dummy + 0.558 3.06* 0.196 0.92 
GCO + 0.591 0.59 0.238 0.15 
BM ? -1.008 4.36** -0.177 0.61 
Signed_DA + 3.175 7.23*** 1.257 2.38 
Intercept ? -7.320 59.14*** -7.541 197.29*** 
Year Dummies  YES YES 
      
n  23,907 27,570 
Wald-statistic  165.37 193.06 
Pseudo R2 (%)  14.97 12.04 
Percent 
Concordant 
 75.4 79.2 
 
The variables used in the regression model are as defined in Appendix 1. We run the logistic regression clustered by firm. For 
each variable, we report the regression coefficient, followed by the robust Wald statistic. ‘*’, ‘**’, and ‘***’ denote significance 




Table 6 (continued) 
 
Panel B: Logistic Regression of Restatement Model  
 
RESTATE = a0 + a1 CONSV + a2 MV + a3 Volatility + a4 BM + a5 LEV + a6 ROA + a7 LOSS + a8 BigN  
+ a9 MERGER + a10 FINANCE + a11 NSEG + a12 FOPS + a13 Inv_Rec + a14 Return + Year Dummies + e 
 
Variable Predicted Sign 
CONSV = CON_KW 
         Coef.             Wald statistic 
CONSV = CON_NOPA 
Coef               Wald statistic 
CONSV - -0.535 10.30*** -0.291 7.73*** 
MV ? 0.074 5.53** 0.109 35.36*** 
Volatility + 3.133 6.20*** -2.766 1.65 
BM ? 0.196 5.47** 0.048 3.45* 
LEV + 0.021 1.30 0.000 0.41 
ROA - -0.011 0.00 0.170 1.93 
Loss + -0.055 0.42 -0.001 0.00 
BigN - 0.130 1.55 0.202 4.80** 
Merger + 0.059 0.58 0.086 1.30 
Finance + 0.140 4.41** 0.081 1.61 
NSEG + 0.000 0.00 0.006 1.04 
FOPS + -0.086 1.28 -0.105 2.10 
Inv_Rec + 0.225 1.31 0.160 0.76 
Return - 0.084 1.65 0.021 0.24 
Intercept ? -4.503 225.47*** -0.291 7.73*** 
Year Dummies  YES YES 
      
n  23,897 28,854 
Wald-statistic  386.11 509.26 
Pseudo R2 (%)  5.59 6.27 
Percent 
Concordant 
 66.5 68.0 
 
The variables used in the regression model are as defined in Appendix 1. We run the logistic regression clustered by firm. For 
each variable, we report the regression coefficient, followed by the robust Wald statistic. To conserve space, we do not report the 




Table 7: Sensitivity Tests24 
 
 
Panel A: Tests with Adjusted Conservatism 









Controls YES YES YES 
    
n 20,549 6,338 1,713 
R-square (%) 80.52 20.33 19.30 




 Panel B: Joint Estimation of Auditor Decisions  








Controls YES YES YES 
n 17,010 17,010 17,010 
R-square (%) 65.84 4.52 29.20 
This panel reports our primary results by estimating the audit fees, going concern opinion, and resignation decisions in a system 





Panel C: Controlling for Corporate Governance 








































 Controls YES YES YES 
n 27,748 9,284 2,404 
R-square (%) 79.36 22.03 19.90 
This panel reports our primary regression results after controlling for the four corporate governance variables in Lara et al. 
(2009). Gindex is the antitakeover protection index constructed by Gompers et al. (2003). Duality is an indicator variable, equals 
1 if the CEO is also the chair of the board and 0 otherwise. Executive is the proportion of executives on the board of directors. 
Meeting is the annual number of meetings of the board of directors.  
 
                                                 
24 To conserve space, we report the coefficient estimates and significances for the variables of interests only. The 
robust t-statistic (Wald statistic) is reported in the parenthesis below the coefficient estimate for the audit fee test 
(going concern opinion and resignation tests). ‘*’, ‘**’, and ‘***’ denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels 
(two-tailed), respectively. 
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Table 7 (continued) 
 
Panel D: Controlling for Discretionary Accruals    































Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES 
n 27,068 27,068 9,065 9,065 2,404 2,404 
R-square (%) 79.20 79.21 20.76 20.72 18.65 18.65 
This panel reports our primary regression results after controlling for signed discretionary accruals (Signed_DA) and the absolute 
values of discretionary accruals (Abs_DA). Performance-adjusted signed discretionary accruals (Signed_DA) are obtained by 
subtracting from each firm’s abnormal accrual the median abnormal accrual from the corresponding ROA-industry decile to 
which the firm belongs. Abs_DA is the absolute value of Signed_DA. 
 
Panel E: Controlling for Income-Increasing Discretionary Accruals 
































Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES 
       
n 27,068 27,068 9,065 9,065 2,404 2,404 
R-square (%) 79.19 79.21 20.46 20.47 18.61 18.62 
 
This panel reports our primary regression results after controlling for income-increasing discretionary accruals. We include 
POS_DA, an indicator variable that equals one if signed discretionary accruals (Signed_DA) is positive and zero otherwise, and 
also include an interaction term, POS_DA*Signed DA.  
 
 
Panel F: Separate Regressions for the Clients of Big N/Non-Big N firms 








 Controls YES YES YES 
    
n 23,072 7,192 1,946 
R-square (%) 78.59 19.80 15.41 
 








 Controls YES YES YES 
    
n 4,676 2,092 458 
R-square (%) 65.83 23.50 11.42 
This panel reports our primary regression results when the sample firms audited by Big N and non-Big N auditors are separately 
estimated.   
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Table 8: Tests with Unconditional Conservatism 
 
 
Panel A: Effect on Audit Fees, Going Concern Opinions, and Auditor Resignations  
 
 UNCONSV = Penman and Zhang (2002) measure 
UNCONSV 
= Beaver and Ryan (2000) measure 
 Fee test Going concern  opinion test 
Resignation  
test 


















Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES 
       
n 39,017 12,261 2,972 32,249 8,879 2,470 




Panel B: Effect on Auditor Litigation and Restatement 
 
 UNCONSV = Penman and Zhang (2002) measure 
UNCONSV 
= Beaver and Ryan (2000) measure 
 Auditor Litigation  












Controls YES YES YES YES 
Year Dummies YES YES YES YES 
     
n 19,134 26,001 14,546 18,769 
R-square (%) 12.67 6.37 12.72 6.55 
 
Panel A reports the association between the two proxies for unconditional conservatism and audit fees, going 
concern opinions, and auditor resignations. Our first proxy for unconditional conservatism is the Penman and 
Zhang’s (2002) measure, which is constructed from unrecorded reserves from LIFO inventory method, R&D, and 
advertising. The second proxy is the Beaver and Ryan’s (2000) measure, which regresses book-to-market ratio on 
current and lagged returns in the prior six years. The firm-specific coefficient estimate is then multiplied by negative 
one so that higher levels of conservatism have higher values. The two proxies are one-year lagged. Panel B reports 
the association between the two proxies for unconditional conservatism and auditor litigation and client 
restatements. To conserve space, we report the coefficient estimates and significances for the variables of interests 
only. The robust t-statistic (Wald statistic) is reported in the parenthesis below the coefficient estimate for the audit 
fee test (for the other tests). 
 
 
 
